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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence over the last few
decades has been unpredictable to say the least. Preemption defies
traditional conservative–liberal alignment, as conservatives are torn
between support of federalism and capitalist efficiency, and liberals
are torn between support of strong national governance and multiplicity of legal remedies. As a result, justices often “flip” to take positions
in tension with those that they take in federalism cases that do not
involve questions of preemption. This tension between competing values combined with the complexity of preemption doctrine and the
* Associate, Ropes & Gray, LLP; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.S., Houghton College, Computer Science. Thanks to Matthew Stephenson for helpful comments.
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sheer number of values at stake in preemption cases produces great
uncertainty. Court watchers and business interests alike have been
unable to predict the path of the Court’s jurisprudence.1
With its recent decision in Wyeth v. Levine,2 however, the Court
has clarified its preemption analysis. Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, firmly rejects an entire line of the Court’s preemption decisions—“purposes and objectives” obstacle preemption. This rejection
is not a sudden development; Justice Thomas has disfavored obstacle
preemption for some time. What is significant, though, is the opinion’s frankness and the clarity that it lends to the Court’s past (and
future) conflict preemption analysis.
While urging the Court to abandon its obstacle preemption doctrine as overly broad and unsupported by congressional authorization,
Justice Thomas simultaneously advocates for the expansion of what
has traditionally been a very narrow category of preemption: impossibility preemption. Such an expansion is likely made necessary by the
gap that would otherwise be left by his rejection of the obstacle preemption category. The natural question, then, is whether Justice
Thomas’s expanded impossibility preemption might look very much
like the narrow version of obstacle preemption that has been applied
by the Court’s liberal bloc for some time. If this is the case, do we now
have a firm five-Justice majority applying a unified doctrine to obstacle preemption cases? If so, what does that doctrine look like?
This Article sets out to answer these questions through an empirical analysis of the Court’s obstacle preemption decisions. Justice
Thomas’s drift to disfavor obstacle preemption has been gradual. Although he did not formally renounce the doctrine until Wyeth, he has
presumably been applying a similar analysis for some time. An examination of each of the Court’s obstacle preemption cases over the last
fifteen years confirms that presumption. The analysis shows that Justice Thomas’s decisions very closely parallel those of the Court’s liberal bloc over the same time period. His broad impossibility analysis
is thus functionally coterminous with a narrow version of obstacle preemption. Justice Thomas and the Court’s liberals form a distinct and
somewhat reliable anti-obstacle preemption bloc. The analysis also
shows, however, that because Justice Thomas and the Court’s liberals
arrive at their positions through quite different analyses, their bloc is
subject to fracture in certain particularly contentious cases.
Part II presents a brief overview of the Court’s current preemption
doctrine. Part III details the breakdown of traditional left–right voting blocs in preemption cases and the consequent failure of political
voting models to explain the Court’s preemption jurisprudence. Part
1. Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 781 (2008).
2. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
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IV uses the recent Wyeth v. Levine decision as a lens through which to
view the Court’s peculiar voting patterns in obstacle preemption
cases. Part V presents an empirical analysis of the Court’s obstacle
preemption cases over the last fifteen years. The data show an emerging five-Justice voting bloc opposed to obstacle preemption resulting
from the surprising alignment of Justice Thomas with the Court’s liberal wing. Finally, Part VI identifies the factors that the loosely aligned voting bloc finds most relevant to its preemption decisions,
exposes weak points in the bloc where fracture is likely, and discusses
how recent appointments will affect voting alignments.
II. DEFINING FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Congress’s power of preemption, rooted in the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution,3 permits federal law to trump state law where it is
undesirable or impossible for two independent legal regimes to coexist. The Supreme Court has recognized two primary categories of preemption: express and implied.4 Express preemption occurs where a
federal statute expressly withdraws from the states regulatory power
over a certain area of law.5 Express preemption doctrine, therefore,
involves the difficult but familiar judicial task of determining the intended preemptive reach of statutory language.6 Implied preemption
is subdivided into two types: field preemption and conflict preemption.7 Field preemption occurs where a federal regulatory regime is so
pervasive as to imply that Congress intended to occupy an entire field
of the law, leaving no room for states to supplement that federal regulation.8 Similarly, but on a smaller scale, conflict preemption occurs
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”).
4. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Pre-emption
may be either expressed or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2000).
6. See id.; Daniel E. Troy & Rebecca K. Wood, Federal Preemption at the Supreme
Court, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 257, 258–60.
7. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (“Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized
at least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of
federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ and conflict pre-emption,
where ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,’ or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ”) (citations omitted).
8. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“In the absence of an
express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field
‘as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
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where, though Congress has demonstrated no intent to occupy an entire field of law, federal law conflicts with a particular state law.9 This
conflict may take either of two forms. First, state law will be preempted “where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both
state and federal law.”10 Second, state law will also be preempted
where, though it is not literally impossible to comply with both state
and federal law, state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”11
This taxonomy of preemption yields four fundamental varieties: express preemption, field preemption, impossibility preemption, and obstacle preemption. This Article will focus primarily on conflict
preemption (both impossibility and obstacle preemption), but the
others will receive passing attention where relevant to the conflict
preemption inquiry.
III. JUDICIAL ALIGNMENT ON PREEMPTION
As many studies have shown, political ideology is an important determinant of Supreme Court decisions. Justices’ votes can be explained, at least in part, by their political preferences.12 In a typical
federalism case, for instance, conservative justices tend to favor states’
rights, while more liberal justices tend to favor a strong central government.13 In the preemption context, however, political ideology
often pulls in opposite directions.14 A decision against preemption in
favor of states’ rights, typically considered conservative, may have a
liberal outcome, and vice versa. “[A] ‘liberal’ vote for the federal gov-

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

supplement it.’ ”) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (“[I]n the absence of
explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in
a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively.”);
see also Nelson, supra note 5, at 227 (“The [Supreme] Court has indicated that a
federal regulatory scheme may be so pervasive as to imply that Congress left no
room for the states to supplant it.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
See Nelson, supra note 5, at 227–28.
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000); see, e.g., Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (presenting the attitudinal model of
judicial decision making, which predicts and explains judicial outcomes as products of judges’ preferred social policies).
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 741, 745 (2000); Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the
Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
43, 79–80 (2006).
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ernment (and against the states) is also a vote for ‘big business’ (and
against pro-regulatory constituencies that want states to regulate
above the federal baseline).”15 Justices’ political preferences stand in
tension, making for “odd coalitions that appear to defy conventional
left/right, liberal/conservative analysis.”16
In response to this tension, says conventional wisdom, the conservative and liberal wings of the Court flip from their positions on
federalism.17 Conservatives can be expected to vote in favor of preemption and liberals to vote against it, with the odd result that the
liberals find themselves promoting states’ rights while conservatives
counter with a plea for a robust national regulatory system.18 Empirical evidence supports this conventional wisdom. Attitudinal models of
judicial decision making rank the Rehnquist Court from most liberal
to most conservative as follows: Justice Stevens anchors the liberal
wing, followed by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, O’Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas on the conservative pole.19 The
Rehnquist Court’s voting record on preemption, with the exception of
Justice Thomas, closely matches this array: Justice Stevens, on the
liberal end, votes in favor of preemption in 41% of cases, while Justice
Scalia, on the conservative end, votes in favor of preemption in 56% of
cases, and the other Justices fall in line between.20
Yet, the conventional wisdom on judicial alignment only goes so
far. When cases are considered in the aggregate, it is undoubtedly
true that conservatives vote in favor of preemption more often than
their liberal colleagues.21 In any individual preemption case, however, both alignment and outcome are quite unpredictable.22 Although alignments generally reflect conservative or liberal ideological
leanings, it is always possible to pick up a vote from an “unlikely” justice.23 No clear voting blocks have emerged to determine outcomes in
close cases.24 Thus, to give two particularly prominent examples, Justice Breyer sided with the Court’s conservatives in favor of preemption
in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,25 and Justice Kennedy voted
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Greve & Klick, supra note 14, at 79.
Troy & Wood, supra note 6, at 260.
See Greve & Klick, supra note 14, at 79–80.
See id.
See Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1158 n.29 (2004).
See Greve & Klick, supra note 14, at 81–82.
See infra Table 1.
See Greve & Klick, supra note 14, at 80 (“[P]reemption case law is not an exact
mirror image of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism: the voting alignments are substantially more fluid.”).
Id. at 83.
Id. at 83–85.
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
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with the Court’s liberals in Wyeth v. Levine.26 Because preemption
case outcomes depend on a large number of factors,27 political ideology
is, by itself, not a perfectly reliable indicator.28 Alignments in preemption cases have an ideological tinge but remain somewhat fluid
and unpredictable.
IV. THE WYETH CLARIFICATION
Although ideological preferences play a significant role the Court’s
decision making, so too does the law itself, and federal preemption is
an area where legal doctrine plays an especially significant part.29
More so than most areas of the law, Justices tend to break from their
traditional blocs, producing surprising alignments.30 This fluidity
renders preemption decisions unpredictable while also making the underlying preemption doctrines especially relevant to outcomes.
Changes or clarifications in the preemption doctrine, therefore, deserve close attention. With its recent preemption decision in Wyeth v.
Levine,31 the Court has produced just such a clarification. In so doing,
the Court has rendered outcomes more predictable in a certain category of preemption cases while also highlighting the role that legal
doctrine should play in models of judicial decision making. This section analyzes the Wyeth decision, highlighting the specific doctrinal
disagreements that separate the majority, concurrence, and dissent.
These disagreements form the foundation for a later32 discussion of
the ways in which Wyeth clarifies the Court’s conflict preemption
jurisprudence.
A.

Factual Background and Legal Claims

In Wyeth v. Levine33 the Court considered the common-law negligence claim of Diane Levine against the drug manufacturer Wyeth.
Levine, suffering from a severe migraine headache, consented to a
physician assistant’s administration of Phenergan, a drug manufactured by the defendant.34 The drug can be administered either intramuscularly or intravenously, and intravenous administration can be
performed by either the slow IV-drip method or the faster but riskier
26. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
27. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 14, at 744–50; David B. Spence & Paula Murray,
The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1164–79 (1999).
28. See Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis
of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 487–88 (2009).
29. See Greve & Klick, supra note 14, at 79; Shapiro, supra note 24, at 487–88.
30. Troy & Wood, supra note 6, at 260.
31. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
32. See infra section IV.E and Parts V–VI.
33. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
34. Id. at 1191.
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IV-push method.35 Because her pain was severe and an initial administration of the drug had failed to provide relief, the physician assistant administered the drug via the IV-push method, which promises
faster relief but also carries a risk of significant side effects.36 The
drug is corrosive, and if it escapes from the vein into surrounding tissue it causes irreversible gangrene.37 Unfortunately, in Levine’s case
this precise danger was realized. As the physician assistant administered the drug, it escaped the vein and came in contact with arterial
blood, resulting in gangrene and eventually requiring the amputation
of Levine’s right forearm.38 As a result of this amputation, Levine incurred substantial medical expenses and was forced to abandon her
career as a professional musician.39
Levine brought a common-law negligence action against Wyeth alleging that Phenergan was defectively labeled.40 She argued that although the drug’s label warned of the danger of gangrene following
inadvertent intra-arterial injection, its labeling was nonetheless defective because it failed to instruct clinicians to use the IV-drip
method as an alternative to the riskier IV-push method.41 Wyeth responded by arguing that Levine’s negligence claim was preempted by
federal law. It urged the Court to find both impossibility and object
preemption. First, it argued that it would have been impossible for it
to comply with a state common-law duty to modify Phenergan’s label
while also remaining in compliance with Federal Drug Administration
(FDA) regulations.42 Second, it argued that recognition of the plaintiff’s state tort action would create an unacceptable obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of Congress by
substituting a lay jury’s decision about drug labeling for the expert
judgment of the FDA.43
B.

The Liberal Bloc’s Majority Opinion

Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kennedy.44 The Court rejected both arguments. In response to Wyeth’s impossibility preemption defense, the
Court noted that although generally speaking a manufacturer may
not change its label after it is approved by the FDA, federal regula35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1191–92.
Id.
Id. at 1193–94.
Id.
Id. at 1190.
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tions do provide a mechanism45 for manufacturers to change a label to
add to or strengthen warnings.46 Because under federal law Wyeth
would have been unilaterally able to strengthen the warnings on
Phenergan’s label, it was not impossible for Wyeth to comply with
both federal and state requirements.47
The Court also rejected Wyeth’s obstacle preemption argument.
Wyeth argued that Congress intended FDA regulations to establish
both a floor and a ceiling for drug labeling requirements and that to
allow a state negligence cause of action would interfere with that objective.48 The Court, however, found no evidence of such an intent on
the part of Congress. Looking to the legislative history of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Court noted that although
the FDCA was intended to bolster consumer protection against harmful products, Congress intentionally provided no federal cause of action.49 Instead, Congress decided to rely on state tort law to provide
appropriate relief.50 Such a policy is inconsistent with the notion that
Congress intended to preempt state common law. Furthermore, reasoning from congressional silence, the Court noted that if Congress
thought that state tort law posed an obstacle to the objectives of the
FDCA, “it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA’s 70-year history.”51 Thus, concluding that Congress did not intend to displace state law, the Court
reasoned that state tort actions posed no obstacle to the achievement
of congressional purposes and objectives.

45. FDA regulations permit drug manufacturers to modify labels “[t]o add or
strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction . . . [or to]
add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product.” 21 C.F.R
§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2010).
46. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
47. Id. at 1199.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1199–1200 & n.7 (discussing House Resolution 6110, 73d Cong. § 25 (1933),
and citing testimony that no federal cause of action is necessary because common-law claims were already available under state law).
50. Id. at 1200.
51. Id. (“[Congress’s] silence on the issue [of preemption], coupled with its certain
awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug
safety and effectiveness.”). The Court also noted Congress’s 1976 enactment of
an express pre-emption provision for medical devices. Congress could have applied this preemption provision to the FDCA in its entirety, including prescription drug requirements, but instead chose to apply the clause only to medical
devices. Id.
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Justice Thomas’s Concurrence

Justice Thomas, concurring only in judgment, agreed with the majority that FDA labeling requirements did not preempt Levine’s common-law negligence claim, but Justice Thomas’s rationale was
markedly different.52 Rather than analyzing Wyeth’s obstacle preemption argument under the Court’s long-standing framework, Justice Thomas boldly rejected as unsound the Court’s entire line of
obstacle preemption jurisprudence.53 Drawing on the theory of dual
sovereignty embodied in Federalist No. 51,54 as well as the Bicameral
and Presentment Clause requirements of the Constitution,55 Thomas
emphasized his “increasing[ ] reluctan[ce] to expand federal statutes
beyond their terms through doctrines of implied pre-emption.”56 Preemption, he argued, must turn on something more than “generalized
notions of congressional purposes that are not contained within the
text of federal law.”57 Preemption analysis of this sort is a “potentially boundless” intrusion on state sovereignty by the federal judiciary without congressional authorization.58 Preemption must instead
be grounded in a direct conflict between state law and the text of validly promulgated federal law.59
Perhaps recognizing that the complete elimination of obstacle preemption could have radical and possibly undesirable consequences,
Justice Thomas also urged the Court to adopt a slightly broader view
of impossibility preemption.60 Though he offers few details, Justice
Thomas hints at what a broader impossibility doctrine might look like.
He notes that the Supremacy Clause does not limit direct conflicts to
52. Id. at 1204–05 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
53. Id. at 1211 (“This Court’s entire body of ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption is
inherently flawed. The cases improperly rely on legislative history, broad atextual notions of congressional purpose, and even congressional inaction in order to
pre-empt state law.”).
54. Id. at 1205 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 266 (James Madison) (M. Beloff
ed., 2d ed. 1987)).
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to
the President of the United States . . . .”).
56. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1207 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431,
459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1207 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59. Id. at 1208.
60. Id. at 1209 (“The Court has generally articulated a very narrow ‘impossibility
standard’—in part because the overly broad sweep of the Court’s ‘purposes and
objectives’ approach has rendered it unnecessary for the Court to rely on ‘impossibility’ pre-emption. . . . Therefore ‘physical impossibility’ may not be the most
appropriate standard for determining whether the text of state and federal laws
directly conflict.”) (citations omitted).
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cases of literal physical impossibility,61 and he instead suggests that
the analysis should focus on whether state law logically contradicts or
is repugnant to federal law.62 However, even under this broader impossibility analysis—whatever its precise contours—Justice Thomas
concluded that the text of the federal laws at issue did not preempt the
plaintiff’s state law claim. Federal law provides a mechanism for
manufacturers to strengthen drug labels, and so it would have been
entirely possible for Wyeth to update Phenergan’s label to account for
the dangers of IV-push administration.63
D.

The Conservative Bloc’s Dissent

Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Roberts in dissent,64 expressed no hesitation whatsoever
in applying the Court’s traditional obstacle preemption framework.
Indeed, he took the opposite position, criticizing the majority for an
overly narrow view of obstacle preemption.65 “Congress made its ‘purpose’ plain in authorizing the FDA—not state tort juries—to determine when and under what circumstances a drug is ‘safe,’ ”66 and by
finding unpreempted the plaintiff’s state tort law claims, the majority
“upset the regulatory balance struck by the federal agency.”67 Justice
Alito argued that state common law is fundamentally inconsistent
with the federal objective of providing standardized safety determinations and that state law must yield in the face of such inconsistency.68
61. Professor Nelson provides a useful example of the somewhat broader reach of a
logical contradiction test. Imagine that a federal law gives workers the right to
join labor unions but that a state law forbids unionization or holds union members liable for damages if they choose to unionize. It would be physically possible
for an individual to comply with both federal and state law. All he would need to
do is refrain from joining a union. Nonetheless, there is a logical contradiction
between the two laws that a court presented with the issue would need to address. By enforcing the state law a court would be ignoring the federal right. See
Nelson, supra note 5, at 260–61.
62. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1209. Justice Thomas references both Professor Nelson’s
language of “logical-contradiction” and Justice Story’s language of constitutional
repugnancy, but it is unclear whether he views these two standards as coterminous, whether he prefers one construct over the other, or whether he might have
in mind a standard with an even broader scope that simply takes logical contradiction and repugnancy as a starting point. Id. (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1836 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833); Nelson,
supra note 5, at 260–61).
63. Id. at 1210.
64. Id. at 1217 (Alito, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1220 (“A faithful application of this Court’s conflict pre-emption cases compels the conclusion that the FDA’s 40-year-long effort to regulate the safety and
efficacy of Phenergan pre-empts respondent’s tort suit. Indeed, that result follows directly from our conclusion in Geier.”).
66. Id. at 1219.
67. Id. at 1220.
68. Id. at 1221.

R
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Lessons and Unanswered Questions

Wyeth is, of course, only a single case, and it is important to avoid
overemphasizing its significance. Nonetheless, a careful reading of
Wyeth and the Court’s prior conflict preemption decisions yields interesting results. Note the alignment of the Justices. In favor of preemption are, as the attitudinal model would suggest,69 Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito of the Court’s conservative core.
Against preemption are, again as the attitudinal model would suggest,
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Although Justice
Kennedy’s vote against preemption might initially seem surprising, he
is a moderate conservative,70 falling roughly in the center of the
Court’s ideological spectrum,71 so it is not entirely unexpected that he
would vote unpredictably in any particular case.
Only Justice Thomas appears out of place. As a conservative, one
might expect him to vote in favor of preemption, and in a great number of cases this intuition would be accurate.72 In obstacle preemption
cases, however, Justice Thomas’s voting history shows a sharp movement leftward, disfavoring preemption in the absence of an express
preemption clause.73 Wyeth represents the culmination of that leftward movement. After years of votes evincing his dissatisfaction with
the Court’s sometimes broad obstacle preemption doctrine,74 Justice
Thomas in Wyeth declares his complete abandonment of that preemption rationale, marking himself as a reliable vote against obstacle preemption in any future decision.
Justice Thomas’s rejection of obstacle preemption, however, does
not by itself shed much light on the Court’s preemption jurisprudence.
The idiosyncratic views of a single Justice are not likely to sway a
majority in future cases.75 What makes Justice Thomas’s position important is the identity (and quantity) of those Justices with whom he
joins in concurrence. Complementing Justice Thomas’s complete re69. See supra Part III.
70. Id.
71. Justice Kennedy, is, however, markedly more conservative on the issue of preemption than in his jurisprudence generally. He is firmly within the conservative
camp on preemption questions. See infra Part V.
72. See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Trans.
Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); Merril
Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431
(2005).
73. See infra Part V.
74. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1207 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment) (collecting cases).
75. Consider Justice Thomas’s idiosyncratic view that the Federal Arbitration Act
should not be read to preempt state law, which, despite repeated lone dissents,
has failed to attract followers. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681 (1996); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52
(1995).
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jection of obstacle preemption in Wyeth was a group of Justices who
reliably construe purposes and objectives preemption narrowly, reserving the doctrine for only the most direct conflicts between state
law and congressional objectives—namely, Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. If Justice Thomas is, along with the Court’s
liberal wing, a reliable vote against obstacle preemption, we might expect to see a predictable bloc of five Justices countering and trumping
the preemption votes of the Court’s conservative wing.
This feature of the Court’s alignment in Wyeth raises two important sets of questions. First, exactly how cohesive is this five-Justice
bloc against obstacle preemption? Justice Thomas’s vision of expanded impossibility preemption sounds very much like the liberal
bloc’s historically narrow version of obstacle preemption.76 Are they
essentially the same analysis under different names, and, if so, do we
now have five Justices determining outcomes under the same framework? Second, if Justice Thomas is engaging in approximately the
same inquiry as the Court’s liberal wing, what can be learned from
that? What factors does this emerging five-Justice bloc find most relevant to the obstacle preemption inquiry?
Fortunately, both sets of questions are susceptible to empirical investigation. The following sections take up each question in turn.
First, Part V identifies and examines every obstacle preemption case
from the stabilization of the Court’s conservative–liberal alignment at
the start of the “Second” Rehnquist Court in the 1994–95 Term until
the present. Justice Thomas’s decision to abandon obstacle preemption was the result of a gradual drift, and so, presumably, he has been
voting more or less consistently with his newly announced view for
some time. A review of the Court’s obstacle preemption decisions over
the last fifteen years reveals both how closely his view parallels that of
the Court’s liberal wing and how cohesively the Court’s liberal wing
itself votes in obstacle preemption cases. Second, Part VI builds on
Part V’s study of the Court’s prior decisions to identify the factors that
the loosely aligned five-Justice bloc finds most relevant in deciding obstacle preemption cases.
V. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF OBSTACLE PREEMPTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1994–2009
A search of the Westlaw “Supreme Court Cases” database for all
cases after 199377 containing terms or phrases indicative of obstacle
preemption78 returned 128 results. This search was, by design, overinclusive, and a closer examination revealed that only twenty-five of
76. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
77. Justice Breyer was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1994.
78. The precise search string was as follows: “pre-empt! & da(aft 1993) & (‘obstacle’
‘impossib!’ ‘implied’ ‘conflict’ ‘purposes and objectives’)”.
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the cases involved a genuine question of obstacle preemption. For
each case an entry was created in a database recording the outcome of
the case as well as the vote of each individual Justice for or against
obstacle preemption. In a few cases it was impossible to determine
how a particular Justice would have voted on the issue of obstacle preemption, because that Justice’s reasoning decided the case on an alternative ground. For example, in Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v.
Michigan Public Service Commission,79 a six-Justice majority clearly
sided against obstacle preemption, but three dissenting Justices
would have found express preemption80 and accordingly failed to
reach the question of obstacle preemption. In such cases, clear votes
for or against obstacle preemption were included in the database
while ambiguous votes were omitted.
A.

General Observations

From a high-level perspective the Court’s obstacle preemption decisions look much like its express, field, and impossibility preemption
decisions. Over the period studied, obstacle preemption was found in
50% of cases, compared to 52% in all types of preemption cases considered collectively.81 The percentage of obstacle preemption cases decided unanimously also appears relatively consistent with all other
types of preemption. Fifty percent of obstacle preemption cases were
decided unanimously with an additional 18% contested only lightly by
two or fewer Justices. This degree of unanimity is somewhat surprising given the Court’s 40% unanimity rate for all cases, but it is consistent with the Court’s higher-than-average unanimity rate of 51% in
preemption cases generally.82 These data show that preemption is
slightly less divisive than other issues to come before the Court and
that, if anything, the Court is somewhat less likely to find obstacle
preemption than express or field preemption.
B.

Ideological Realignment on Obstacle Preemption

Although the Court’s obstacle preemption decisions appear almost
identical to its general preemption decisions when considered from a
high level, a closer examination reveals surprising changes in the
Court’s alignment. Consider Table 1 and Figure A below, which compare the probability of a given Justice voting in favor of obstacle preemption to the probability of that Justice voting for preemption
generally. Although the Court as a whole is about as likely to find
obstacle preemption as preemption generally, the individual Justices
vote quite differently depending on the type of preemption involved.
79.
80.
81.
82.

545 U.S. 440 (2005).
Id. at 464.
Greve & Klick, supra note 14, at 57.
Id. at 56.
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The data indicate movement in both directions along the ideological
spectrum. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Stevens
are all, perhaps surprisingly,83 somewhat more likely to find obstacle
preemption than other varieties. Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, on
the other hand, move in the opposite direction, voting for obstacle preemption less frequently than for preemption generally.
Justice

Obstacle Preemption

Preemption Generally84

.61
.57
.58
.53
.48
.46
.44
.38
.35
.50

.53
.56
.50
.52
.41
.43
.52
.41
.44
.52

Kennedy
Scalia
Rehnquist
O’Connor
Stevens
Souter
Breyer
Ginsburg
Thomas
Court

Table 1.

Probability of Voting in Favor of Obstacle Preemption vs.
Preemption Generally

0.65
Kennedy

0.60
0.55
0.50

Kennedy
Court
Court

Rehnquist
Scalia
Scalia
O'Connor
O'Connor
Rehnquist
Stevens
Souter

0.45

Souter
Stevens

0.40

Breyer
Thomas
Breyer
Ginsburg
Ginsburg

0.35

Thomas

0.30
Obstacle Preemption

Preemption Generally

Figure A
83. One might have expected all Justices to find obstacle preemption, which relies on
the ascertainment of an inexplicit congressional intent to preempt, less frequently than they find express, field, or impossibility preemption, where congressional intent to preempt is more readily discernible. These data appear to belie
that intuition, though, of course, this may have more to do with the Court’s case
selection than any actual preference among certain Justices for obstacle
preemption.
84. These data are drawn from a 2006 study by Professors Greve and Klick and fail
to take into account decisions in the 2004–2009 Terms. Given the expansive
scope of their study, however, it seems unlikely that the relatively small number
of decisions in the last few years would significantly alter their results. Greve &
Klick, supra note 14.
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The data appear to confirm Justice Thomas’s alignment with the
liberal bloc on the issue of obstacle preemption. Unlike preemption
generally, where he retains his conservative pro-preemption stance,
on questions of obstacle preemption Justice Thomas is firmly in the
liberal anti-preemption camp, voting for obstacle preemption only 35%
of the time—less than any other Justice.85 Other significant shifts
along the ideological spectrum are apparent as well. These movements can be seen clearly in Table 2 below, which compares the ideological rankings of each Court member in all cases generally, in all
preemption cases, and in obstacle preemption cases specifically.
Rankings are according to the percentage of cases in which each Justice has voted in what is generally regarded as a liberal or conservative fashion, with one being the most and nine the least conservative.
Justice Thomas’s shift is the most severe. He is generally regarded to
be the Court’s most conservative member,86 but in preemption cases
he usually shifts to the center, and in obstacle preemption cases specifically he shifts all the way to the leftmost position on the Court.
Justice Kennedy also shifts substantially, but in the opposite direction. Although he is regarded as a centrist,87 falling squarely in middle of the Court ideologically, in preemption cases he moves decidedly
rightward, voting in favor of obstacle preemption more frequently
than any other Justice. We see a second movement rightward in Justice Stevens who, though often regarded as the Court’s most liberal
Justice

General Attitudinal
Model of All Cases

All Preemption

Obstacle
Preemption

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

5
1
4
2
3
6
6
8
8

9
3
2
1
4
6
7
8
5

Thomas
Scalia
Rehnquist
Kennedy
O’Connor
Souter
Breyer
Ginsburg
Stevens

Table 2.

Ideological Rank by Case Type

85. Given Justice Thomas’s complete renunciation of obstacle preemption doctrine in
Wyeth, it’s not surprising that his votes in favor of it are few and far between.
Indeed, one might question how it could be that he ever votes for obstacle preemption. The answer may lie, to some extent, in his unique vision of impossibility
preemption. See infra section V.A.
86. Robert H. Smith, Uncoupling the “Centrist Bloc”: An Empirical Analysis of the
Thesis of a Dominant, Moderate Bloc on the United States Supreme Court, 62
TENN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994).
87. Id. at 1–2
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member,88 shifts rightward into a centrist position on questions of obstacle preemption.
These movements may at first glance seem relatively insignificant.
A few Justices are slightly more likely to vote for obstacle preemption
than others, but for most, obstacle preemption is about a fifty–fifty
proposition, and, as shown by Table 1 above, the case outcomes reflect
that. This characterization, though, would be misleading. In an area
of the law where 50% of cases are decided unanimously, it’s unsurprising that most Justices’ decision rates would be close to those of the
Court as a whole. In closely contested cases, however, in which at
least three Justices dissent from the majority view, the Court is substantially more polarized. In such cases the law points clearly in
neither direction, and the Justices’ differences are magnified, as reflected in Table 3 and Figure B. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor, Stevens, and Breyer diverge only slightly from their averages in all obstacle preemption cases. Justices Kennedy and Scalia
favor preemption more strongly, and Justices Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg more strongly disfavor it.
Justice
Kennedy
Scalia
Rehnquist
O’Connor
Stevens
Souter
Breyer
Ginsburg
Thomas
Court

Table 3.

Contested Obstacle
Preemption Cases

All Obstacle Preemption
Cases

.71
.71
.60
.60
.43
.29
.43
.14
.29
.43

.61
.57
.58
.53
.48
.46
.44
.38
.35
.50

Probability of Voting for Obstacle Preemption

The comparison between the Court’s obstacle preemption and general preemption decisions suggests important positional shifts among
the Justices based on the case’s theory of preemption. Justice Thomas
is a moderate on preemption generally but strongly disfavors obstacle
preemption. Justice Stevens, on the other hand, shifts in the opposite
direction, disfavoring obstacle preemption less strongly than preemption generally. This suggests that models of judicial decision making
that fail to account for legal doctrine may, at least in the context of
preemption, be ignoring an important factor in the Courts decisions.89
88. Id. at 1.
89. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 28, at 487 (“There can, of course, be no question that
policy preferences or ideology play a role in Supreme Court decision making. But
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Breyer
Breyer
Ginsburg
Thomas

0.30

Souter

Thomas

0.20
Ginsburg

0.10
All Obstacle Preemption Cases

Contested Obstacle Preemption Cases

Figure B
Court watchers and potential litigants would be well-advised to consider the shifts in judicial outlook that occur in cases of obstacle
preemption.
C.

Obstacle Preemption Voting Blocs

The data clearly confirm Wyeth’s suggestion90 of an ideological reshuffling of the Court in the context of obstacle preemption to an
alignment in which five Justices can generally be expected to vote
against obstacle preemption, and four Justices can generally be expected to vote in favor of it. Yet, this does not alone imply the existence of a consistent voting bloc against obstacle preemption. It is
entirely possible that, although individual Justices exhibit ideological
preferences in one direction or another, they do not regularly vote together in a consistent bloc. Indeed, this is precisely what occurs in
preemption cases generally: “Conservative justices tend to vote for
preemption in many cases, and liberal justices tend to do the opposite.
But neither side seems to agree on what cases, precisely, call for the
‘default’ response.”91
In the context of obstacle preemption, however, the Court appears
to divide into somewhat more cohesive groups. Five Justices cannot
only be expected to vote against obstacle preemption in the majority of
the interesting and important contemporary questions—and the ones that cannot
be answered using [the Spaeth Database]—are whether and how much law matters as well, how ideology and law interact with or affect each other, and how
these interactions vary from case to case or from Justice to Justice.”).
90. See supra Part IV.
91. Greve & Klick, supra note 14, at 84.

R
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cases, but they can be expected to vote together against obstacle preemption in the same cases. Consider Table 4 below, which shows the
frequency with which each Justice has voted with the majority in constested obstacle preemption decisions. The data show no absolute voting bloc. Rather, they show a semicohesive bloc that, while not
absolute, is determinative in the majority of cases. Note, for instance,
that Justice Breyer has formed part of the majority in every contested
obstacle preemption decision. Justice Souter is not far behind, forming part of the majority in all but one case.
Justice

Pro-Preemption (3)

Anti-Preemption (4)

All Contested (7)

3
2
1
1
2
3
2
1
1

2
1
1
1
3
4
4
3
4

5
3
2
2
5
7
6
4
5

Kennedy
Scalia
Rehnquist
O’Connor
Stevens
Breyer
Souter
Thomas
Ginsburg

Table 4.

Frequency of Voting with the Majority in
Contested Holdings

This anti-obstacle preemption bloc can be seen somewhat more
clearly by looking at the probability of individual Justices voting together in contested obstacle preemption cases, as exhibited by Table 5
below. It is the Court’s liberal wing and Justice Thomas that most
often vote with the majority. Note, too, that the strongest alliance
pairs exist among these Justices. Justice Souter votes with Justices
Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg 86% of the time and Justice Thomas
71% of the time. The data show no comparable conservative alliances.
Still, it is important not to overemphasize the significance of these alliances. They are far from absolute. Justice Thomas votes with Justice Scalia as often as with Justices Stevens and Breyer and with the
Court as a whole only slightly more than half of the time. The data
Justice

Kennedy Scalia Rehnquist O’Connor Stevens Breyer Souter Thomas Ginsburg

Kennedy
Scalia
Rehnquist
O’Connor
Stevens
Breyer
Souter
Thomas
Ginsburg
Court

1.00
.43
.80
.40
.43
.71
.57
.57
.43
.71

Table 5.

Justices’ Probability of Voting Together in Contested Obstacle Preemption Cases

1.00
.40
.40
.43
.43
.29
.57
.14
.43

1.00
.60
0.00
.40
.20
.40
.40
.40

1.00
.40
.40
.20
0.00
.40
.40

1.00
.71
.86
.57
.71
.71

1.00
.86
.57
.71
1.00

1.00
.71
.86
.86

1.00
.57
.57

1.00
.71
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show a weak but nonethless significant voting bloc against obstacle
preemption.
The data also appear to disconfirm the hypothesis that Justice
Thomas’s newly announced, expanded view of impossibility preemption may be essentially identical to the liberal wing’s narrow view of
obstacle preemption.92 Although he did not formally declare his complete rejection of obstacle preemption and his corresponding embrace
of broader impossibility preemption until Wyeth, Justice Thomas has
been voting more or less in accord with these views for some time.93 If
his expanded impossibility preemption were identical to the liberal
wing’s narrow preemption, we would see a much higher correlation
between his votes and the rest of the anti-obstacle preemption bloc.
Instead, despite being the Court’s most reliable obstacle preemption
opponent, he appears to be the outlier of the anti-preemption coalition.
This suggests that the bloc’s votes are the products of different
frameworks—that although Justice Thomas’s broadened impossibility
preemption and the liberals’ narrow obstacle preemption analyses
often produce the same non-preemptive outcomes, their differing underlying premises occasionally produce divergent results.
VI. COUNTING TO FIVE: THE COURT’S EMERGING
CONFLICT PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The previous section showed a weak anti-obstacle preemption bloc
that more often than not votes together but sometimes fractures in
contested cases. It is from different doctrinal routes that Justice
Thomas and the rest of the bloc come to be aligned, so it is not overly
surprising that the alliance is not ironclad. This section highlights the
differences between Justice Thomas’s approach and that of the rest of
the bloc, enabling court watchers and potential litigants to predict
outcomes and present their cases more effectively.
92. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1209 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(“The Court has generally articulated a very narrow ‘impossibility standard’—in
part because the overly broad sweep of the Court’s ‘purposes and objectives’ approach has rendered it unnecessary for the Court to rely on ‘impossibility’ preemption. . . . Therefore, ‘physical impossibility’ may not be the most appropriate
standard for determining whether the text of state and federal laws directly conflict”) (citations omitted); supra section III.E.
93. Indeed, he suggests as much in Wyeth: “I have become ‘increasing[ly] reluctan[t]
to expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of implied preemption.’ My review of this Court’s broad implied pre-emption precedents, particularly its ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence, has increased
my concerns that implied pre-emption doctrines have not always been constitutionally applied.” Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1207 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 678 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment)).
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As seen most recently in his Wyeth concurrence, the key factor in
Justice Thomas’s preemption analysis is the explicitness of congressional action. Absent clear action by Congress to preempt state law,
states should be presumed to retain their sovereignty.94 Any other
judicial approach would aggrandize the judiciary at the expense of the
legislature and violate the principle of dual sovereignty enshrined in
the Constitution.95 Justice Thomas appears to take quite seriously
(more so than the rest of the Court) the Court’s oft-repeated rules that
“the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case”96 and that “we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”97
This concern for state sovereignty and the separation of powers affects even Justice Thomas’s express preemption jurisprudence. In
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood,98 for example, he, joined by
Justice Souter, dissented from the majority’s interpretation of the
Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) to preempt a common-law negligence claim by the widow of a man killed at a railroad crossing.99 The
majority reasoned that the FRSA’s express preemption of conflicting
state laws precluded the plaintiff’s claim that the train was traveling
at an unsafe speed, because regulations enacted pursuant to the
FRSA already set maximum speeds based on track characteristics.100
Justice Thomas disagreed and would have required more explicit regulatory action before finding preemption. He reasoned that regulations setting speed maximums with regard to track characteristics
could not reasonably be interpreted as preempting state law regulating safe train speed through grade crossings.101
Even in his newly expanded view of impossibility preemption,
where congressional preemptive intent must be inferred, Justice
Thomas is likely to insist quite rigidly on readily-discernible intent.
The Court’s finding of preemption in Barnett Bank of Marion County
v. Nelson102 provides an example of what Justice Thomas’s new impossibility preemption might look like. In that case the Court found
preempted a Florida state law prohibiting national banks from selling
insurance, because it interfered with Congress’s purposes and objec94. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1205–07 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
95. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205–07.
96. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
97. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
98. 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
99. Id. at 676.
100. Id. at 673–76.
101. Id. at 677 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
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tives in enacting the McCarran–Ferguson Act of 1916, which permits
national banks to sell insurance in small towns.103 Post-Wyeth, the
obstacle preemption doctrine would, of course, be unavailable to Justice Thomas. The Nelson case, however, fits neatly within an expanded impossibility framework. Compliance with both state and
federal law is not literally impossible. National banks could simply
refrain from selling insurance in small Florida towns, despite the fact
that federal law appears explicitly to permit it. Nonetheless the state
and federal laws are impossible to reconcile in a less literal yet still
very palpable sense104—a sense that Justice Thomas would rely on as
indicating congressional preemptive intent despite the lack of an express preemption clause.
In one category of cases, however, Justice Thomas appears willing
to settle for something slightly less than perfect evidence of congressional intent. Where an express preemption clause is clearly intended
to preempt something, but that something is not entirely clear, Justice
Thomas appears willing to invoke principles of obstacle preemption to
resolve the question of preemptive scope. For instance, in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,105 the Court considered a state insurance
law that Rush Prudential argued was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.106 The majority found the state provision to fall within the Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s
savings clause, which exempts state laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities.107 Justice Thomas, however, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy,108 reasoned that even a
law regulating insurance could be preempted under “ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption” if it stood as a sufficient obstacle to Congress’s broader purposes in enacting the statute.109 Thus, it appears
that Justice Thomas’s deference to state sovereignty is lessened where
Congress has already evidenced at least some intent to preempt and
the primary question is one of preemptive scope.
B.

The Liberal Wing

Like Justice Thomas, Justices Souter, Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg side against obstacle preemption on a fairly consistent basis.
However, to the extent that it is possible to generalize about all four
collectively, they appear to do so for markedly different reasons.
Whereas Justice Thomas’s position stems almost entirely from his re103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 28–29.
See Nelson, supra note 5, at 260–61.
536 U.S. 355 (2002).
Id. at 366–67.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 388.
See id. at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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spect for the constitional principles of dual sovereignty and separation
of powers, the Court’s liberal wing deploys a wider variety of arguments in support of its limited obstacle preemption jurisprudence.
Unlike Justice Thomas, for instance, who reserves the presumption
against preemption for use only in determining whether Congress intended federal law to have preemptive effect,110 the other members of
the anti-obstacle preemption bloc deploy the presumption more
broadly to determine the preemptive scope of federal law as well as its
preemptive effect.111 The presumption serves as a thumb on the scale
against preemption throughout the entire preemption analysis.
Similarly, these Justices rely on a second interpretive principle eschewed by Justice Thomas: unless its intent to do so is especially
clear, Congress should not be presumed to preempt state law where
federal preemption would remove all means of judicial recourse.112
The principle has intuitive appeal, but, as Justice Thomas notes, it
often relies on inferences from congressional silence or ambiguous legislative history.113 Interestingly, however, Justice Thomas’s rejection
of obstacle preemption has a similar function. He would require explicit congressional intent not only where preemption would remove
all judicial recourse, but in all cases, whether or not an alternative
remedy exists. Thus, the interpretive principle is a sort of middle
110. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 544–45 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
111. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009) (“We rely on the presumption because respect for the States as independent sovereigns in our federal system leads us to assume that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law
causes of action.”) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431,
449 (2005) (“Because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt statelaw causes of action.”) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947).
112. See Bates, 544 U.S. at 449–50 (“The long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the basic presumption against
pre-emption. If Congress had intended to deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more
clearly.”) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)); Riegel
v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 1016 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It is difficult
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial
recourse for large numbers of consumers injured by defective medical devices.”)
(quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Compare Bates, 544 U.S. at 449–50 (Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, relying on the presumption), with id. at 456–58 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (rejecting the majority’s reliance on the historical availability
of a state-law remedy as an improper inference from silence in the legislative
history).
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ground that allows those Justices who use it to fine-tune preemption
doctrine to suit the facts of particular cases, while Justice Thomas relies on a blunter instrument.
Finally, the liberal wing, unlike Justice Thomas, is quite willing to
rely on legislative history to infer broad notions of congressional purpose.114 Indeed, this is, in a sense, the crux of the entire debate between Justice Thomas and the rest of the Court. Should the Court
defer to an imprecise notion of congressional purpose (whether from
legislative history or elsewhere), or should the Court set a more rigorous standard of preemptive intent? This willingness to look to legislative history and congressional intent may explain why it is Justice
Thomas and not one of the other anti-obstacle preemption bloc members who has the most consistent record of votes against obstacle preemption.115 Without legislative history, he has no reason upon which
to ground a vote for preemption, even if that result appears desirable
in a particular instance. The other bloc members, on the other hand,
have more freedom to find for preemption where they deem circumstances to require it. Thus, for instance, it is Justice Breyer who
jumps ship to favor preemption in Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co.,116 citing legislative history to buttress his argument that the imposition of additional common-law vehicle safety requirements would
interfere with Congress’s purposes and objectives in passing the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.117 Justice Thomas, not at
all hesitant to find preemption when expressly mandated by statute,118 remained firmly opposed, citing the Act’s savings clause as reason to curtail significantly its preemptive scope.119
Collectively these factors show a divide between Justice Thomas
and the rest of the anti-obstacle preemption bloc. While Justice
Thomas’s obstacle preemption jurisprudence is heavily dependant on
a single factor—explicit congressional authorization—the other Justices employ a more varied arsenal, considering such factors as legislative history and intent, availability of alternative remedies, and the
presumption against infringing on areas of traditional state sovereignty.120 As a result Justice Thomas, limited to a single determini114. Compare, e.g., Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1192–94, with id. at 1211 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
115. See supra section IV.B.
116. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
117. Id. at 874–76.
118. See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 551 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito) (arguing that
the majority should have read the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act’s express preemption clause to preclude the plaintiff’s state misrepresentative advertising claim).
119. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 897–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg).
120. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–68 (1941).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB401.txt

unknown

Seq: 24

21-JUL-11

12:25

2011] OBSTACLE PREEMPTION IN THE SUPREME COURT

705

tive factor, rarely sides in favor of obstacle preemption, while the
other members of the bloc can be expected to vote in favor of obstacle
preemption any particular case depending on the significance they
place on each relevant decisional factor.
C.

The Newcomers

One glaring limitation of this analysis is, of course, that it fails to
account for the Court’s recent additions: Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Such a defect is inevitable in
any far-reaching analysis of a fluid adjudicative body,121 but it is
nonetheless important to recognize the limitation and make an effort
to take into account the available data. What analysis is possible suggests that these newcomers will have little effect on the Court’s obstacle preemption decisions. Thus far, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito appear to be mirror images of Justice Scalia, voting with him in
all three obstacle preemption decisions in which they have taken
part.122 Perhaps surprisingly, in two of the three cases, their vote
with Justice Scalia placed them in the opposite camp of Justice Kennedy,123 the Court’s most reliable pro–obstacle preemption vote.124
This suggests that, like Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who preceded them, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will
tend to vote in favor of obstacle preemption in contested cases, leaving
the Court’s balance of power unchanged.
Predictive data for Justices Sotomayor and Kagan are sparse. Justice Sotomayor’s preemption decisions prior to her elevation to the Supreme Court suggest, however, that like Justice Souter, she will side
against preemption in the majority of contested cases.125 Also like
There is not—and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be—
any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to
determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Congress. This
Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or
federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following
expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible
constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick.
Id.
121. This study attempts to limit the problem as much as possible by focusing on the
period of stability following Justice Breyer’s nomination to the Court in 1994.
122. Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2118 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s finding of preemption); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187, 1217 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s finding of
no preemption); Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) (voting with
the majority in favor of preemption).
123. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. 2108; Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187.
124. See supra section IV.B.
125. See Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 71
(2006); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136 (2d Cir.
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Justice Souter, she will employ the full panoply of interpretive tools to
determine Congress’s preemptive intent.126 Like Justices Ginsburg,
Stevens, and Breyer, for instance, she will presume against preemption where a plaintiff would be left with inadequate alternative remedies. In Rombom v. United Airlines,127 where airline passengers
brought suit against United Airlines for mental and physical distress
after the airline summoned police officers to remove them from a
plane, then-Judge Sotomayor considered relevant to a finding against
field preemption both the inadequacy of administrative remedies,
which would not have provided monetary damages, and the general
presumption against incursion into areas of traditional state
sovereignty.128
Justice Kagan’s appointment to the Court presents the greatest
puzzle. She, unlike other recent appointees, has no prior judicial experience and thus no body of decisions from which to predict the positions she will take as a member of the Court.129 What little data are
available suggest that Justice Kagan will, like Justice Stevens, her
predecessor, tend to side with the Court’s liberal wing on most issues.
As U.S. Solicitor General, Kagan filed amicus briefs on behalf of the
federal government in two significant preemption cases: Williamson v.
Mazda Motor of America, Inc.130 and Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria.131 Although we should be hesitant to read too much into positions taken while acting in a representative capacity, Kagan’s stance
in both briefs132 places her squarely within the liberal camp.
At issue in Williamson is whether a safety regulation promulgated
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 677 (2006); A. Brod v. SK&I Co., 998 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); Modeste v. Local 1199, 850 F. Supp. 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 38 F.3d
626 (2d Cir. 1994); Rombom v. United Airlines, 867 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
But see King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002); St. Johnsbury
Trucking Co. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 199 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Rombom, 867 F. Supp. 214.
Id.
Id. at 218, 221.
Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, U.S. SUPREME COURT,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Williamson
v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., No. 08-1314 (Apr. 23, 2010), 2010 WL 1653014.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, No. 09-115 (May 28, 2010), 2010 WL 21901118.
Kagan stopped acting as Solicitor General on May 17, 2010. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, U.S. SUPREME COURT, http://www.supreme
court.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). The government’s
brief in Candaleria was not filed until May 28, 2010. Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, No. 09-115 (May 28,
2010), 2010 WL 2190418. As a result, Kagan is not the counsel of record on the
government’s amicus brief in that case. Nonetheless, she presumably played a
large part in its development.
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preempts a state tort law claim against Mazda Motor despite the statute’s savings clause, which expressly preserves common-law liability.133 Mazda argued that, as in Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co.,134 the plaintiff’s tort remedy is preempted, despite the savings
clause, under a theory of obstacle preemption.135 In her amicus brief
on behalf of the United States, then-Solicitor General Kagan rejected
this view, distinguishing Geier and arguing against a finding of preemption.136 In so doing she resisted a broad reading of Geier and aligned herself with Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg,
all of whom dissented in Geier.137
By contrast, in Candelaria, a case challenging an Arizona’s immigration statute,138 Kagan’s amicus brief argues in favor of federal preemption, but it does so under the theory most palatable to liberals,139
express preemption, and in a case where federal preemption supports
a liberal result—relaxation of anti-immigration measures. In both
cases, therefore, then-Solicitor General Kagan’s position appears consistent with the Court’s anti-obstacle preemption bloc. If her positions
as an advocate substantially reflect her own individual views, her replacement of Justice Stevens will not significantly alter the Court’s
balance on preemption questions.
On the whole, the available data suggest that recent changes to the
Court’s composition will not dramatically affect its obstacle preemption decisions. A somewhat fragile but nonetheless important antiobstacle preemption voting bloc remains, with Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan replacing Justices Souter and Stevens, and that group continues to be counterbalanced by four relatively reliable votes from the
Court’s conservative wing in favor of obstacle preemption.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article’s analysis of the Court’s recent preemption decisions
yields several important results. First, the analysis shows that, while
the Court’s preemption decisions considered in the aggregate may fall
133. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545, 547, 551 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008).
134. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
135. See Williamson, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 552–53.
136. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., No. 08-1314 (Aug. 6, 2010), 2010 WL 4150188.
137. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 976–77 (9th Cir.
2008).
139. The Court’s conservatives find state law preempted under a theory of obstacle
preemption as frequently or more frequently than they do under a theory of express preemption, while the Court’s liberals exhibit the opposite tendency, finding obstacle preemption even less frequently than they do express preemption.
See supra Table 1 & Figure A.
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generally along ideological lines, predictive models based solely on judicial ideology miss an important determinant of legal decisions: doctrinal disputes among the Justices. Thus, while Justice Kennedy is
generally regarded as a moderate, he shifts in a markedly conservative direction on preemption questions. Moreover, moving even further in the opposite direction, Justice Thomas switches poles entirely,
from a strongly conservative position in the Court’s decisions generally to a strong, traditionally liberal, view in obstacle preemption
cases. Second, the analysis shows that Justice Thomas’s renunciation
of obstacle preemption in Wyeth v. Levine is both sincere and significant. His voting record backs his stated disdain for obstacle preemption, creating, when paired with the Court’s liberal wing, a clearly
defined but somewhat weak voting bloc against obstacle preemption.
Third, the analysis shows that while the members of the anti-obstacle
preemption voting bloc frequently arrive at the same non-preemptive
results, they get there via quite different routes. Justice Thomas focuses on express congressional authorization to preempt, while the
rest of the bloc members consider a wide variety of factors significant.
Justice Thomas’s use of such a blunt decision-making instrument creates a lack of flexibility that pushes him to the extreme, voting for
obstacle preemption less than any other Justice, while the other Justices are able to tailor their analyses more closely to particular
circumstances.
Considered collectively, these insights should allow court watchers
to predict outcomes more reliably and potential litigants to target the
arguments most likely to persuade each Justice. The Justices’ views
shift dramatically depending on the particular case’s theory of preemption, and even Justices who consistently vote together do so for
markedly different reasons.

